







Faculty of Law 
 
Research Paper No. 7/2013 
_______________________________________________________________ 
                                                                        
                                                                
 
The Fundamental Right to (Intellectual) 





Forthcoming in: Christophe Geiger (ed.),  




The article makes two points regarding the fundamental rights dimensions of 
intellectual property (IP). First, it explains why the prevailing approach to 
balancing the fundamental right to intellectual property with conflicting 
fundamental freedoms as if they were of equal rank is conceptually flawed and 
should be replaced by a justification paradigm. Second, it highlights the pre-
eminent role of the legislature and the much more limited role of the judiciary in 
developing IP law. The arguments are based on  an analysis of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and last but not least the German 
Constitutional Court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, regarding the respective 
inter-/supra-/national fundamental-rights regimes. 
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I. From Balancing to Justification 
 
1. The Balancing Paradigm and Its Consequences 
 
Subject to some - albeit significant - renegades like the U.S. Supreme Court,
1 it 
is now widely accepted in Europe, other jurisdictions like South Africa,
2 and not 
least in international IP law that fundamental and human-rights law is highly 
relevant for IP.
3  This discourse is dominated by advocates of a “balancing 
paradigm”.
4  Christophe Geiger  argues that tensions between property and 
freedom have to be brought into a balanced relationship and that this reasoning 
offers possibilities for a balanced development of IP law generally.
5 According 
to Daniel Gervais, conflicts between copyright and rights such as the right to 
privacy or to information imply striking a balance.
6 Laurence Helfer and Graeme 
Austin  opine that striking the appropriate balance between recognising and 
rewarding human creativity and innovation on the one hand and ensuring public 
access to these fruits of the human mind on the other poses the “central 
challenge” when bringing together the two regimes of human rights and IP.
7  
The jurisprudence of the CJEU provides ample examples for the balancing 
paradigm. Confronted with the question of a Spanish court whether a number of 
directives and art 17 para 2 and art 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the EU (Charter)
8 require Member States to lay down an obligation of internet 
access providers to communicate personal data to copyright holders in the 
context of civil enforcement proceedings, the Court held that the fundamental 
rights to property and to an effective remedy have to be “reconciled” with the 
                                                 
1 US Supreme Court Eldred v. Ashcroft 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (“when … Congress has not 
altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First Amendment scrutiny is 
unnecessary”); US Supreme Court Golan v. Holder 132 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2012) (“The ‘traditional 
contours’ of copyright protection, i.e., the ‘idea/expression dichotomy’ and the ‘fair use’ defense, 
… serve as ‘built-in First Amendment accommodations’”). 
2 Constitutional Court of South Africa Laugh it Off Promotions CC v. South African Breweries 
International t/a Sabmark International and Another [2005] ZACC 7, IIC 36 (2005), 868. 
3 See Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, Human Rights and Intellectual Property - Mapping 
the Global Interface, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 
4 See Laurence R. Helfer, The New Innovation Frontier? Intellectual Property and the European 
Court of Human Rights, Harvard International Law Journal 49 (2008), 1, at 46 et seq. 
5  Christophe Geiger, “Constitutionalising” Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of 
Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the European Union, IIC 37 (2006), 371, 386. 
6 Daniel J. Gervais, Making Copyright Whole: A Principled Approach to Copyright Exceptions 
and Limitation, University of Ottawa Law & Technology Journal 5 (2008), 1.  
7 Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, supra note 3, at 507. 
8 OJ No C-364/1, 18.12.2000. 3 
 
fundamental right to respect for private life, firstly, by applying the IP and data 
protection directives at stake, but secondly also by interpreting the relatively 
general provisions of those directives in a way “which allows a fair balance to be 
struck between the various fundamental rights protected”.
9 In Scarlet, the CJEU 
developed this nucleus to the general principle that “the protection of the 
fundamental right to property, which includes the rights linked to intellectual 
property, must be balanced against the protection of other fundamental 
rights.”
10  The notion of a “fair balance” is also a core feature in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR
11 and in the practice of national courts, for example 
the Austrian
12 and Canadian Supreme Courts.
13  
Although (or probably because) this tool avoids providing guidance as to why 
which normative value prevails, it yields very concrete results. With regard to 
the international level, Daniel Gervais presents a long and detailed list of uses 
that international copyright law on principle should not prohibit, ranging from 
uses “in the private sphere of users” to educational and governmental uses, 
subject however to uses “that will not demonstrably affect the normal 
commercial exploitation” and to a compensation mechanism if the limitation or 
exception causes a loss of income.
14 If courts with the power to declare both 
statutes and lower court decisions unconstitutional employ the balancing 
paradigm, these courts inevitably define both the upper and lower boundaries of 
a permissible IP policy.
15 For example, the CJEU found that court injunctions 
against internet access and host providers to install a very specific automatic 
system for filtering peer-to-peer networks in order to prevent copyright 
infringements did not respect the requirement of a fair balance between the 
right to intellectual property on the one hand and the freedom to conduct 
business, the right to protection of personal data and the freedom to receive or 
                                                 
9 ECJ Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271, paras 61-69. 
10 CJEU Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 41 et seq; CJEU Case C-
360/10 SABAM [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 42-44. 
11 E.g. ECHR no 36769/08 Ashby Donald et Autres c. France, § 40. 
12 Oberster Gerichtshof Case 4 Ob 66/10z, 13.07.2010, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 
2011, 275; Oberster Gerichtshof Case 4 Ob 42/12y, 17.04.2012, Ecolex 2012, 706. 
13 Canadian Supreme Court CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 
13. 
14 Daniel J. Gervais, supra note 6, at 21-22. The discussions about limitations and exceptions to 
copyright at WIPO show that none of these allegations can claim broad international consensus; 
see http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/limitations/. 
15 Laurence R. Helfer, supra note 4, at 46. 4 
 
impart information on the other.
16 Balancing four fundamental rights allows for 
the resolution of a very concrete private dispute – a magic wand indeed, which 
is moreover readily at hand: In Bonnier Audio, the CJEU applied the fair-
balance test to a specific compromise between copyright enforcement on the 
internet and privacy under Swedish national law, although the Högsta 
domstolen had limited its referring questions to certain directives and expressly 
declared that the enforcement measure at issue was considered 
proportionate.
17  And in Luksan, the CJEU held that national legislation that 
denies the principal director of a cinematographic work the rights to exploit her 
work runs afoul of art 17 para 2 of the Charter.
18 This jurisprudence is criticised 
for advancing a harmonisation agenda beyond the existing acquis  without, 
however, thoroughly applying the Charter. The reference to striking a “fair 
balance” is considered nothing more than “rhetorical cover for the expansion of 
[the CJEU’s] jurisdiction”.
19 
Balancing fundamental rights in a particular case can even bring about a new 
exception to copyright law. According to the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof, an 
otherwise infringing use of a protected work – for example the making available 
of critical newspaper articles about a person on that person’s website without 
any further comments
20  or the modification of and comment on an election 
poster of a political party in order to protest against pro-abortion policies
21 – is 
nevertheless lawful if six requirements are met: The expression of the 
defendant is protected under art 10 ECHR; it is not a false and defamatory 
statement; the use of the work does not undermine the economic interests of 
the author; it does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work; it does 
not prejudice the legitimate interests of the author; and last but not least, the 
defendant cannot at all or only insufficiently exercise her fundamental right to 
freedom of expression without interfering with the exclusive copyrights of the 
                                                 
16 CJEU Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 41 et seq; CJEU Case C-
360/10 SABAM [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 46 et seq. 
17 CJEU Case C-461/10 Bonnier Audio [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 56-60. 
18 CJEU Case C-277/10 Luksan [2012] ECR I-0000, paras 68-71. 
19  Jonathan Griffiths, Constitutionalising or Harmonising? The Court of Justice, the Right to 
Property and European Copyright Law, 38 European Law Review (2013) 65, 78. 
20 Oberster Gerichtshof Case 4 Ob 66/10z, 13.07.2010, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 
2011, 275. 
21 Oberster Gerichtshof Case 4 Ob 66/10z, 13.07.2010, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und Medienrecht 
2011, 275. 5 
 
plaintiff. By articulating these general requirements, the Oberster Gerichtshof 
has created a kind of free-speech fair-use clause. Convincing as this result may 
be, the Austrian legislature has until now refrained from taking this step. This is 
not only due to a corresponding civil-law tradition, ignorance or lobbying: The 
closed list of optional limitations and exceptions to copyright according to art 5 
Directive 2001/29 on Copyright in the Information Society
22  does not allow 
Member States to codify such a flexible rule. Instead, this measure is within the 
exclusive competence of the EU legislature.
23  
 
2. Flaws of the Balancing Paradigm 
 
These examples already highlight why the balancing paradigm has been 
subject to widespread criticism. This method fails to explain according to which 
normative criteria a conflict between fundamental rights is to be resolved. What 
such weighing without a scale will yield is not foreseeable, and it automatically 
tends to lead to ad-hoc interventions with weak if any foundation in positive 
law.
24  
When it comes to conflicts between the fundamental right to property and other 
fundamental rights such as the freedom of expression, the balancing paradigm 
is particularly inappropriate: The reason for this specific defect is that the 
balancing paradigm rests upon the assumption that all fundamental rights are of 
equal normative value, and that there is no hierarchical order between them.
25 
Indeed, the CJEU employs the balancing exercise irrespective of whether the 
freedom to conduct a business conflicts with the freedom of the press or the 
right to property.
26 The Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof justifies its jurisprudence 
in conflicts between copyright and the freedom of expression with a reference to 
                                                 
22 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, OJ L 
167, 22.6.2001, p 10. 
23 See infra II 2. 
24 Critical Abraham Drassinower, From Distribution to Dialogue: Remarks on The Concept of 
Balance in Copyright Law, The Journal of Corporation Law 34 (2009), 991, 998; Jonathan 
Griffiths, supra note 19, at 74 (“vacuous and unhelpful”); Laurence R. Helfer, supra note 4, at 
50. 
25 Christophe Geiger, note 5, at 386; Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, supra note 3, at 
509 (conceptual equivalence). 
26  CJEU Case C-283/11  Sky Österreich  [2013] ECR I-0000, paras 59-60 with reference to 
Promusicae (supra note 9). 6 
 
the case law of the ECHR in conflicts between the freedom of the press and the 
right to privacy.
27  
This starting point, however, disregards a fundamental difference between the 
right to property and other individual freedoms. To hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas, to live a private and family life, to conduct a 
business, to undertake artistic and scientific activities –  all these human 
activities are conceived of as preceding state activity.
28 As undefined areas of 
individual freedom, they are protected by fundamental rights against unjustified 
state interventions. The common principle underlying these specific freedoms is 
the principle of equal negative liberty. In this principle, every person’s dignity, 
freedom and equality before the law culminate. The preservation of a maximum 
of equal negative liberty can be said to form the ultimate end of a democratic 
society under the rule of law.
29 Conflicts between fundamental freedoms have 
to be resolved under the principle of praktische Konkordanz (consistency in 
practice) to the effect that the fundamental rights of all persons involved are 
granted the broadest possible effect.
30 
Conflicts involving the fundamental right to property have to be resolved 
according to different rules because the subject matter and structure of this 
fundamental right differs categorically from the aforementioned fundamental 
freedoms. The fundamental right to property protects neither human activities 
and properties nor valuable goods as fruits of human labour as such. Instead, it 
guarantees the existence and individual enjoyment of certain legal institutions, 
namely, property rights with sufficient basis in the legal order. Lawmaking is 
required in order to establish the subject matter of the fundamental right to 
property and thus its applicability in the first place.
31  The legislature is the 
                                                 
27  See  Oberster Gerichtshof  Case 4 Ob 42/12y, 17.04.2012,  Ecolex 2012, 706,  at 3.2 with 
reference to ECHR no 40660/08, 60641/08 von Hannover v. Germany (no 2). 
28  Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförde, Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation, Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 1974, 1529, 1530 et seq. 
29 See Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 209/83 and others, 15.12.1983, BVerfGE 65, 1, 
41 - Volkszählung; Helmut Coing, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 5th ed, de Gruyter 1999, 
at 153 (freedom and equality as the basis of the entire development of the modern state); 
Alexander Peukert, Güterzuordnung als Rechtsprinzip, Mohr Siebeck 2008, 726 et seq, 774 et 
seq, 906 et seq. 
30 On the principle of “praktische Konkordanz”, see Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvF 1, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 6/74, 25.02.1975, BVerfGE 39, 1, 43 – Schwangerschaftsabbruch I; Konrad Hesse, 
Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 20th ed, Müller 1999, para 
317 et seq. 
31 Alexander Peukert, supra note 29, at 692 et seq. 7 
 
creator of the subject matter of the fundamental right to property, which in turn 
protects this legal institution from unjustified interferences by that legislature 
and other public authorities. 
This structure of the fundamental right to property is well established in the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR on art 1 of protocol no 1 ECHR. This article entitles 
every person to the peaceful enjoyment of his “possessions”, but leaves states 
the right to control the use of “property”. However, the travaux préparatoires 
show that this inconsistent wording is meant to guarantee the “right of property” 
or the “right to property” and thus a legal institution and not an economic value 
or interest as such.
32 The ECHR holds that art 1 of protocol no 1 is not limited to 
ownership of physical goods and is independent of the formal classification in 
domestic law. The right to property is applicable if the circumstances of the 
case, considered as a whole, may be regarded as having conferred on the 
applicant “title” or “property rights” to a substantive interest.
33  That title can 
either take the form of an existing property right
34 or a legitimate expectation of 
obtaining such a right. However, such an “expectation” is “legitimate” only if 
there is a “sufficient basis for the interest in national law”, for example in the 
case of specific legislation or a settled case law of the domestic courts 
confirming its existence.
35 In contrast, future income, including the “goodwill” of 
a business as such, cannot be considered to constitute “possessions” unless it 
has already been earned or is definitely payable.
36  An arguable or already 
lapsed claim is equally insufficient to establish a property right under art 1 of 
protocol no 1 ECHR.
37  Thus, the fundamental right to property does not 
                                                 
32  ECHR no 6833/74 Marckx v. Belgium, § 63; Jens Meyer-Ladewig,  Europäische 
Menschenrechtskonvention, 3rd ed, Nomos 2011, art 1 para 8. 
33 ECHR no 31107/96 Iatridis v. Greece [GC], ECHR 1999-II, § 54; ECHR no 33202/96 Beyeler 
v. Italy [GC], ECHR 2000-I, § 100; ECHR no 48939/99 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII, § 124; 
ECHR no 15578/03 Yuriy Lobanov v. Russia, § 32.  
34 See ECHR no 31206/02 Fokas v. Turkey, § 34; on licenses/privileges to perform a business 
ECHR no 23780/08 Malik v. The United Kingdom, §§ 89 et seq with further references. 
35 See ECHR no 21861/03 Hamer v. Belgium, ECHR 2007-V, § 76; ECHR no 31925/08, Grudic 
v. Serbia, § 72 (pensions); ECHR no 58472/00 Dima c. la Roumanie (copyrights); Arjen van 
Rijn, in: Pieter van Dijk et al, Theory and Practice of the European convention on Human 
Rights, 4th ed, Intersentia 2006, 869. 
36 ECHR no 23780/08 Malik v. The United Kingdom, §§ 90-93. 
37 See ECHR no 44912/98 Kopecký v. Slovakia, ECHR 2004-IX, § 52; ECHR no 73049/01 
Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, ECHR 2007-I, §§ 63 et seq; ECHR no 31206/02 Fokas v. 
Turkey, § 33, §§ 35 ff.; ECHR no 18768/05 Saghinadze and Others v. Georgia, § 103; ECHR no 
38433/09 Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di Stefano v. Italy, § 171. 8 
 
guarantee the right to acquire possessions,
38 but it applies, for example, to the 
already existing bundle of financial rights and interests that arise upon an 
application for the registration of a trade mark.
39 
The same principles govern art 17 para 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the EU. It only applies to “lawfully acquired possessions”, which the CJEU 
defines as “rights  with an asset value creating an established legal position 
under the legal system, enabling the holder to exercise those rights 
autonomously and for his benefit”.
40 
Finally, art 14 of the German Basic Law is even more outspoken on the point. 
Firstly, its wording refers to legal institutions, namely, “Eigentum” (properly 
translated as property right),
41 and “Erbrecht” (the right of inheritance). Art 14 
para 1 s 2 goes on to proclaim that “the content and limits” and thus the very 
definition of what constitutes “Eigentum” and the right of inheritance “shall be 
defined by the laws”.
42  The  Bundesverfassungsgericht  has consistently held 
that there is no absolute, pre-defined concept of property.
43 The fundamental 
right to property is only applicable if the claimant can show that she owns an 
existing subjective right, which is allocated to her according to the law, and 
which entitles her to use and dispose of the subject matter for private purposes 
and to exclude others from it as in the classical case of Sacheigentum (rights in 
real property).
44  
                                                 
38 ECHR no 23780/08 Malik v. The United Kingdom, § 88. 
39 ECHR no 73049/01 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, ECHR 2007-I, § 76 et seq. 
40 CJEU Case C-283/11 Sky Österreich [2013] ECR I-0000, para 34. Similarly Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Series C 
no 79 (2001), para 144 (“Property can be defined as those material things which can be 
possessed, as well as any right which may be part of a person’s patrimony; that concept 
includes all movables and immovables, corporal and incorporal elements and any other 
intangible object capable of having value”). 
41 On the use of “property” as a translation of “Eigentum” and “propriété” see Alexander Peukert, 
“Intellectual Property”, in: Jürgen Basedow/Klaus J. Hopt/Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The 
Max Planck Encyclopaedia of European Private Law, Oxford University Press 2012, vol I, 926, 
930; in the context of art 1 of protocol no 1 ECHR see Jens Meyer-Ladewig, supra note 32, art 1 
para 8. 
42  See  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvL 19/76, 12.06.1979, BVerfGE 52, 1, 
27 - Kleingarten I. 
43 Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 987/58, 14.11.1962, BVerfGE 15, 126, 143 et seq – 
Staatsbankrott. 
44  See  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 673/64, 18.12.1968, BVerfGE 24, 367, 
390  -  Hamburgisches Deichordnungsgesetz;  Bundesverfassungsgericht  1 BvL 9/75, 
22.05.1979, BVerfGE 51, 193, 211 - Weingesetz I; Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 1804/03, 
07.12.2004, BVerfGE 112, 93, 107 – Zwangsarbeiter. 9 
 
Since exclusive property rights
45 are “creatures of statute”,
46 there is a numerus 
clausus of such rights. What is not in the books has no legal existence. In our 
case, these books are IP statutes.
47 At least under German constitutional law, 
but I would argue under the European Convention of Human Rights
48 and EU 
law too,
49 it is in the exclusive competence of the legislature to create exclusive 
IP rights.
50 Only the representative, parliamentary consent to a new exclusive 
right justifies its binding effect erga omnes. Only this form ensures that the legal 
basis meets the requirements of the rule of law as regards foreseeability, 
accessibility and precision.
51 
This constitutional reasoning is fully in line with the history and practice of 
modern international IP law. Ever since Donaldson v. Beckett,
52 it has been 
widely accepted in both common law and civil law jurisdictions that copyrights, 
patents and other IPRs only  exist under the statutes, as “creatures” of the 
                                                 
45 With regard to contractual and non-contractual claims as property rights, private parties and 
courts have a more significant role to play. On the distinction between exclusive property rights, 
contractual and non-contractual claims see Alexander Peukert, supra note 29, at 873 et seq. 
46 Canadian Supreme Court Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain Inc., 2002 SCC 34, 
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 336, at para 5; US Supreme Court Wheaton v. Peters 33 U.S. 591 (1834), at 
662-663 (“This right … does not exist at common law - it originated, if at all, under the acts of 
congress.”);  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvL 77/78, 15.07.1981, BVerfGE 58, 300, 
330 - Naßauskiesung (“The legislature creates on the level of objective laws those provisions 
which establish the legal position of the owner”). 
47 On the applicability of the fundamental right to property to IP rights see art 17 para 2 Charter; 
ECHR no 73049/01 Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal, ECHR 2007-I, § 72; ECHR nos 25379/04, 
21688/05, 21722/05 and 21770/05 Paeffgen GmbH v. Germany; ECHR no 40397/12 Fredrik 
Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden. 
48 However, the ECHR Court does not consider it necessary to decide in the abstract whether 
the role in the continental-law system of a rule established by the courts is comparable to that of 
statutory provisions, it being more important – in any event – to ensure that the legal basis at 
stake meets the requirements of foreseeability, accessibility and precision in order to be 
“lawful”; see ECHR no 34478/97 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v. Turkey, §§ 50, 51 with further 
references. 
49 On the protection of sporting events see CJEU Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football 
Association Premier League and Others and Karen Murphy [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 96-104. 
50  Alexander Peukert, supra note 29, passim; Jonathan Griffiths, supra note 19, at 69-70; 
Sascha Sebastian, Geistiges Eigentum als europäisches Menschenrecht - Zur Bedeutung von 
Art. 1 des 1. Zusatzprotokolls zur EMRK für das Immaterialgüterrecht, Gewerblicher 
Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht, Internationaler Teil 2013, 524, at 527. 
51 See ECHR no 34478/97 Fener Rum Erkek Lisesi Vakfi v. Turkey, § 50; Peukert, supra note 
29, at 884 et seq. 
52 Donaldson v. Beckett 1 English Reports 837, 839 (1774) (“and such a restraint of the liberty 
of many, for the sake of one, was never established by natural justice”) contra Millar v. Taylor 4 
Burr. 2303, at 2334 (1769): (“It is certainly not agreeable to natural justice, that a stranger 
should reap the beneficial pecuniary produce of another man’s work”). 10 
 
legislature. For this reason, they are universally considered “territorial in nature”, 
bound to the territory of the public authority granting them.
53  
In sum, the fundamental right to property entails a paradox: Property rights are 
a result of state activity but at the same time they are protected from 
interference by public authorities. This unique structure distinguishes the right to 
property from all other individual freedoms. Therefore, conflicts between the 
right to property and for example the freedom of expression cannot be resolved 
by weighing or balancing as if they were of equal rank and structure.
54 Nor is 
there a principal priority of either the fundamental right to property or conflicting 
fundamental rights and freedoms.  
 
3. Justifying Expansions and Limitations of Property Rights 
 
Instead, the paradox of the fundamental right to property has to be resolved by 
distinguishing two points in time: before and after IP legislation creates IP rights. 
At both points in time, expanding or limiting IP protection requires justification, 
not balancing. 
The moment before an IP law enters into effect and thereby creates or extends 
IP rights, everyone is equally at liberty to use the respective intangible. By 
establishing areas of private dominion, the legislature encroaches upon the 
public domain. It grants the owner a privilege of exhibiting certain activities 
exclusively whereas all others have to refrain from this conduct. Thereby, their 
principally equal negative liberty to access and use the good for communicative 
or other purposes is limited. Such interference always  requires justification, 
                                                 
53 German Reichsgericht II 45/02, 02.05.1902, RGZ 51, 263, at 266; Supreme Court of Canada, 
Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of 
Internet Providers, 2004 SCC 45, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 427, at para 2; ECJ Case C-192/04 
Lagardère Active Broadcast [2005] ECR I-7199, para 46; US Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit,  Voda v. Cordis  476 F.3d 887, at 902 (2007); Alexander Peukert, “Territoriality and 
Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law”, in Günther Handl/Joachim Zekoll/Peer 
Zumbansen (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of 
Globalization, Brill Academic Publishing 2012, 189-228. 
54 This method is not even proper if fundamental freedoms or two or more property rights (see, 
eg ECHR nos 25379/04, 21688/05, 21722/05 and 21770/05 Paeffgen GmbH v. Germany) 
conflict. The reason is that disputes between private parties involve two different dimensions of 
fundamental rights, namely the protective function of fundamental rights (typically invoked by 
the plaintiff) and their classical defensive function (typically invoked by the defendant); see, in 
this regard, Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Grundrechte und Privatrecht, Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 184 (1984), 201, at 212 et seq.  11 
 
even if it is executed in later cases.
55 Correspondingly, IP protection is not an 
end in itself but an instrument to achieve distinct aims.
56 Thus, even enforcing 
copyright law against the persons running “The Pirate Bay” peer-to-peer 
network amounts to an interference with their right to freedom of expression 
under art 10 ECHR. This measure violates art 10 unless it was “prescribed by 
law”, pursued one or more of the legitimate aims referred to in art 10 para 2 and 
was “necessary in a democratic society” to attain such aim or aims.
57 
After an IP right has been created, the justification requirement reverses course. 
Now, it is  the interference with the fundamental right to property –  be it a 
deprivation or the control of the use of the property right - that must be lawful 
and must pursue a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim 
it seeks to realise.
58  
In sum, the relationship between IP rights and other fundamental rights is more 
complex than the balancing paradigm suggests. Whereas the creation, 
expansion and enforcement of IP rights has to be justified in light of necessary 
interferences with individual freedoms of users, the limitation of existing 
property rights has to be justified with a view to the fundamental right to 
property. Thus, the justification paradigm introduces a differentiated hierarchy of 
norms, which allows one to identify a basic rule (property or freedom, 
respectively) on which a court can rely unless there are lawful, legitimate and 
proportionate reasons not to do so. This methodology is well established in the 
practice of constitutional courts. It calls upon a court to enter into a structured 
reasoning as to the legal basis at stake (lawfulness), the aims of the measure 
(legitimacy), and its effects (proportionality).
59  Even the principle of 
proportionality, however, is not properly applied by simply listing all interests 
                                                 
55 See ECJ Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR I-1953, para 26 and art 52 para 1 
Charter: “Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must 
be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms”. German 
constitutional law reaches the same result by extending the fundamental right to a “free 
development of one’s personality” (art 2 para 1 Basic Law) to every human activity; see 
Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 253/56, 16.01.1957, BVerfGE 6, 32, 36 et seq – Elfes; 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 921/85, 06.06.1989, BVerfGE 80, 137, 152 et seq - Reiten im 
Walde. 
56 Alexander Peukert, Intellectual Property as an End in Itself?, European Intellectual Property 
Review 2011, 67 et seq. 
57 ECHR no 40397/12 Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden. 
58 See art 1 para 1 s 2, para 2 of protocol no 1 ECHR; art 17 para 1 s 2, 3 Charter; art 14 para 
2, 3 German Basic Law. 
59 In the context of the ECHR see, for example, ECHR Moskal v. Poland, no 10373/05, §§ 49-
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involved and picking the most important one. Instead, it requires a reasoning 
why the IP expansion/enforcement or limitation is capable of furthering the 
legitimate aim, whether it is necessary or whether there are less intrusive 
means to achieve the end, and finally, whether the measure is reasonable.
60 
Only at the very last level may all interests be weighed. However, this balancing 
exercise may be resolved by drawing on the applicable basic rule – be it the 
protection of an existing property right or, conversely, the equal freedom to use 
public domain knowledge.  
In sum, the justification paradigm provides an advanced constitutional 
methodology which promises a more coherent, comprehensive and transparent 
reasoning than a mere balancing of competing interests.
61 This is not to say that 
the outcomes will necessarily differ. Doubtlessly, prejudices are very powerful 
drivers of decision making.
62 It is, however, a naturalistic fallacy to therefore 
champion arbitrariness. A normative perspective under the rule of law demands 
a legal methodology that hinders ad hoc decisions and facilitates criticism and 
review by forcing the court into a structured, transparent reasoning. The 
justification approach comes much closer to this ideal than an invitation to 
weigh all interests involved.  
 
II. The Limited Constitutional Limits of IP Lawmaking 
 
Let me now proceed to my second point concerning the separation of power 
between the legislature and the judiciary in the area of IP law. In my view, the 
task to develop and justify IP protection  is above all addressed to the 
legislature. The role of the judiciary, in contrast, is relatively limited. Again, 




                                                 
60  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 596/56, 11.06.1958, BVerfGE 7, 377, 
405 - Apothekenurteil; ECJ Case C-44/79 Hauer [1979] ECR I-3727, paras 17 et seq. 
61 In its more recent practice regarding art 1 of protocol no 1, the ECHR seems to rely less 
strongly on the rhetoric of “striking a fair balance” and instead applies the more differentiated 
three-prong test of lawfulness, legitimate aim and proportionality; see eg ECHR Światek  v. 
Poland (Application no 8578/04) 4 December 2012, § 61, § 70. 
62 Josef Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung: Rationalitätsgedanken 
der richterlichen Entscheidungspraxis, Athenäum-Verlag 1970, at 136. 
63 See supra notes 3-6. 13 
 
1. The Creation of IP Rights 
 
Since the creation of IP rights is within the exclusive competence of the 
legislature,
64  it necessarily follows that at the moment of the creation of the 
rights, it is the legislature who has to consider conflicting fundamental rights. At 
that early stage, the legislature enjoys a very wide margin of appreciation. This 
is not to say that IP policy is categorically immune to fundamental-rights scrutiny 
or limited as in the U.S., where the Supreme Court refuses to even enter into a 
free-speech review of copyright as long as the idea/expression dichotomy and 
the fair-use defence as “built-in First Amendment accommodations” are 
available.
65 However, neither the right to property nor other fundamental rights 
imply a specific scope of IP protection:  
It is true that art 27 para 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
66 art 
15 para 1 (c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights
67  and national/regional guarantees of the right to property exhibit a 
protective dimension by calling for some form of property protection of works 
and inventions.
68  Art 17 para 2 of the Charter can certainly be read as 
articulating such a law-making mandate. The German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht  also assumes that “the constituting elements of 
copyright as property within the meaning of the constitution include the 
axiomatic allocation of the proceeds of creative activity to the author by way of 
the provisions of private law, and the author’s freedom to dispose of his or her 
rights in his or her own responsibility.”
69  
                                                 
64 Supra I 2. 
65 See supra note 1.  
66 “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. 
67 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone … to benefit from 
the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author”. 
68 Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, supra note 3, at 513 et seq; on positive obligations to 
secure the effective exercise of the rights defined in the ECHR see, eg ECHR no 878/80 X and 
Y v. The Netherlands, series A no 91, p 11, §§ 22-23; ECHR no 59857/00, Bennich-Zalewski v. 
Poland, § 91. 
69  Copyright:  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 1631/08, 30.08.2010, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2011, 288, at para 60 (English version available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20100830_1bvr163108en.html); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht  1 BvR 276/71, 07.07.1971, BVerfGE 31, 270, 
274 - Schulfunksendung; Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 352/71, 25.10.1978, BVerfGE 49, 
382, 392 -  Kirchenmusik;  Bundesverfassungsgericht  1 BvR 1571/02, 26.01.2005, NJW-RR 
2005, 686, 687; on the protection of inventors see Bundesverfassungsgericht  Cases 1 BvL 14 
 
“There is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of [art 17 para 2 of the 
Charter] or in the [CJEU’s] case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and 
must for that reason be absolutely protected.”
70 Similarly, art 14 of the German 
Basic Law does not require that IP rights extend to “every conceivable 
possibility of exploitation”. Instead, the social function (Sozialbindung) of 
property rights calls for appropriate standards that ensure use and exploitation 
of the right in conformity with its general nature and social significance.
71 It is up 
to the legislature to set, within the limits of its “relatively wide” margin of 
appreciation, the boundaries of IP protection so that the rights correspond to the 
nature of the subject matter and the interests of all parties concerned.
72  
As a result, the abstract mandate to establish private property rights only 
concerns a very limited core of protection. The international human-rights 
framework merely requires that states adhere to previously established IP rules 
and forego arbitrary exercises of state power.
73  The abstract institutional 
guarantee of property under the German Basic Law demands that an individual 
is generally enabled to live an autonomous life in the economic sphere 
independent of public welfare.
74 It is certainly debatable whether authors and 
inventors would really be deprived of this prospect if the scope of today’s 
copyright and patent protection were significantly reduced or even abolished 
altogether. In any event, I am not aware of any court decision that has actually 
held that a certain level of protection falls short of that constitutional minimum. 
The international IP framework of today is definitely way beyond this chimera.
75 
                                                                                                                                               
5/70, 1 BvL 6/70, 1 BvL 9/70, 15.01.1974, BVerfGE 36, 281, 290 et seq; 
Bundesverfassungsgericht  Cases 1 BvR 1942/99, 1 BvR 1995/99, 13.03.2001, NJW 2001, 
1783, 1785. 
70 CJEU Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended [2011] ECR I-0000, para 43; CJEU Case C-360/10 
SABAM [2012] ECR I-0000, para 41. 
71 On authors’ rights Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 766/66, 08.07.1971, BVerfGE 31, 
275, 286 et seq (no duty to provide for an unlimited protection); Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 
BvR 352/71, 25.10.1978, BVerfGE 49, 382, 403 – Kirchenmusik (not every public performance 
has to be subject to exclusive rights). On patent law Bundesverfassungsgericht Cases 1 BvL 
5/70, 1 BvL 6/70, 1 BvL 9/70, 15.01.1974, BVerfGE 36, 281, 290 et seq (no patent protection 
without registration); Bundesverfassungsgericht 1 BvR 1942/99, 1 BvR 1995/99, 13.03.2001, 
NJW 2001, 1783, 1784 (no duty to prevent competition after the patent term elapsed). 
72  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 766/66, 08.07.1971, BVerfGE 31, 275, 286; 
Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 1631/08, 30.08.2010, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2011, 288, at para 60 (English version available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20100830_1bvr163108en.html). 
73 Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, supra note 3, at 516. 
74 Alexander Peukert, supra note 29, at 702 et seq. 
75 Laurence R. Helfer/Graeme W. Austin, supra note 3, at 514. 15 
 
Conversely, there are also few upper constitutional limits on the expansion of 
IPRs. If the legislature prefers new exclusive rights and longer terms of 
protection because it considers this solution to be in the public interest, courts 
must not replace this judgment with their own political view. Only if such 
encroachments upon the public domain and thus individual freedoms cannot be 
said to be “necessary in a democratic society” may such an expansion be struck 
down for constitutional reasons.
76  Retroactive term extensions are certainly 
debatable in this context.
77 An unlimited term of copyright or patent protection 
would clearly run afoul of communicative freedoms.
78  
 
2. Interferences with Existing IP Rights 
 
If IP rights have been established by IP laws, both the European Convention on 
Human Rights and art 17 para 1 of the Charter require that their deprivation or 
the control of their use find a foreseeable basis in the law.
79 Again, it is the 
legislature who has to provide for the respective regulations. Accordingly, it is 
the legislature who is called upon to justify such interferences with the 
fundamental right to property. The task of the courts is basically to apply this IP 
framework, not to rewrite it. 
And again, the legislature enjoys a considerable margin of appreciation to 
amend IP legislation. The fundamental right to property does not guarantee 
today’s standard of IP protection. According to the CJEU, the right to property is 
not an absolute right and must be viewed in relation to its social function. 
Consequently, its exercise may be restricted, provided that those restrictions in 
fact correspond to objectives of general interest and do not constitute 
disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of 
the right guaranteed.
80 Similarly, the ECHR asks whether an interference by a 
                                                 
76 ECHR no 40397/12 Fredrik Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden. 
77 See Alexander Peukert, Die Gemeinfreiheit: Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik, Mohr-Siebeck 2012, 
79 et seq. Without any reference to the fundamental right to conduct a business CJEU Case C-
168/09 Flos [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 32 et seq Contra US Supreme Court Golan v. Holder 132 
S.Ct. 873 (2012). 
78 Alexander Peukert, supra note 78, at 76 et seq. 
79 See supra note 58. 
80 ECJ Case C-200/96 Metronome Musik [1998] ECR I-1953, para 21; CJEU Case C-379/08 
Raffinerie Mediterranee and others [2010] ECR I-2007, para 80; CJEU Case C-416/10 Jozef 
Križan and others [2013] ECR I-0000, para 113. Similarly Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 
BvL 77/78, 15.07.1981, BVerfGE 58, 300, 351 - Naßauskiesung. 16 
 
public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of existing property rights is lawful 
and pursues a legitimate aim by means reasonably proportionate to the aim to 
be realised.
81  If these general requirements are met, new limitations or 
exceptions to existing IP rights may be introduced. According to all 
fundamental-rights regimes considered here, the legislature enjoys, depending 




84  discretion in determining the steps to be taken to ensure 
compliance with fundamental-rights obligations.  
The constitutional margin becomes wider still if the IP legislation applies only to 
works, inventions or other subject matter created after the coming into force of 
the new, more limited rules. In such a situation, the amendment does not 
reduce the scope of already existing IP rights. Instead, future IP rights will come 
into existence with a more limited scope than rights that accrued in the same 
subject matter before the amendment. Such an adjustment is constitutional 
already if the legislature can show objective reasons for its new policy.
85 As 
explained, the fundamental right to property does not tie future IP policy to 
today’s standards but only requires a very basic minimum of IP protection. 
Thus, even drastic reductions of the scope of IP protection - be it by increasing 
the thresholds for protection, shortening the terms of protection or even 
excluding certain subject matter from protection at all – can be accomplished 
without running afoul of constitutional obligations. 
As already indicated, the task of the judiciary is a much more limited one. What 
courts are called upon to do is to apply the existing IP framework as it stands, 
as regards both its upper and its lower boundaries.
86 Trivial as this assessment 
may seem at first glance, it has significant effects if applied rigorously. 
                                                 
81 ECHR nos 7151/75, 7152/75 Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, series A no 52, § 69; ECHR 
no 36813/97 Scordino v. Italy (no 1), ECHR 2006-V, § 93; ECHR no 27912/02 Suljagić v. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina; ECHR no 8578/04 Swiatek v. Poland, § 61.  
82 ECHR no 31443/96 Broniowski v. Poland, ECHR 2004-V, § 144; ECHR no 36022/97 Hatton 
and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], ECHR 2003-VIII, §§ 98 et seq. 
83 In the area of IP legislation, see ECHR no 36769/08 Ashby Donald et Autres c. France, § 40. 
84  ECHR no 45036/98 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 
2005-VI, § 149; ECHR no 20496/02 Silickiene v. Lithuania, § 63. 
85  See  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Cases 1 BvL 5/70, 1 BvL 6/70, 1 BvL 9/70, 15.01.1974, 
BVerfGE 36, 281, 290 et seq; Alexander Peukert, supra 29, at 697 et seq. 
86 Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 1916/09, 19.07.2011, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2011, 3428, at para 86 - Le Corbusier. 17 
 
On the one hand, exclusivity extends only so far as it is provided for in the law. 
Today’s level of protection must not be interpreted beyond what was clearly 
envisaged by the legislature because that level is already way beyond the 
constitutional minimum of property protection.
87 Since IP rights depart from the 
basic norm of equal negative liberty
88  or, put metaphorically, IP rights are 
“islands of exclusivity in an ocean of freedom”,
89 the scope of exclusivity must 
not be interpreted extensively. The fundamental right to property does not imply 
a “high level of protection” logic.
90 The CJEU is therefore correct in holding that 
the distribution right according to art 4 para 1 Directive 2001/29 applies only 
where there is a transfer of the ownership of the original of a work or a copy 
thereof but not to a public exhibition of a copy of a work – in spite of the fact that 
the rightholder will have to forego compensation for this valuable use.
91 
On the other hand, limitations and exceptions also have to be applied according 
to their purpose, which is to realise certain fundamental freedoms. Just as 
exclusive rights must not be interpreted extensively, statutory limitations and 
exceptions must not be applied in a particularly restrictive way.
92 In the early 
days of its copyright jurisprudence, the CJEU was of the opposite view. The 
court argued that the exhaustive list of optional copyright exceptions and 
limitations in art 5 Directive 2001/29 has to be interpreted strictly because it is 
subject to the three-step test,
93 and the provisions derogate from the general 
principle established by the Directive, namely, the requirement of authorisation 
from the rightholder for any reproduction of a protected work.
94 In the meantime, 
however, the court has clarified and significantly qualified its rigid staring point. 
It has added a second principle according to which even a “strict” interpretation 
of copyright exceptions and limitations nonetheless must enable the 
effectiveness of the provision at stake to be safeguarded and its purpose to be 
observed, which is – again – to strike a fair balance between interests of the 
                                                 
87 ECJ Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg [2008] ECR I-2731, paras 37 et seq. 
88 Supra I 2. 
89  Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the Coherence of Intellectual 
Property Law?, IIC 35 (2004), 268, at 272.  
90 Alexander Peukert, supra note 57, at 67 et seq. 
91 ECJ Case C-456/06 Peek & Cloppenburg [2008] ECR I-2731, paras 37 et seq. 
92 Canadian Supreme Court CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 SCC 
13, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, para 48 (interpretation of fair dealing).  
93 See art 5 para 5 Directive 2001/29 (supra note 22). 
94 ECJ Case C-5/08 Infopaq I [2009] ECR I-6569, paras 56-59. 18 
 
rightholder and those of users.
95 Whereas this new doctrine is a step in the right 
direction, it suffers from the same flaws as the underlying balancing paradigm: If 
the two principles of interpreting copyright exceptions and limitations (namely 
strict vs. flexible interpretation of exceptions/limitations) are of equal rank but 
lead to contrary results (namely exclusivity vs. lawful use), it remains – again – 
unclear why one of the two approaches prevails.  
Moreover, in Brüstle v. Greenpeace, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU did not 
apply this hermeneutic framework to the interpretation of EU Directive 98/44 on 
the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions. Instead, it chose a different 
methodology, namely, that “the meaning and scope of terms for which 
European Union law provides no definition must be determined by considering, 
inter alia, the context in which they occur and the purposes of the rules of which 
they form part”.
96 The Court held that although Directive 98/44 seeks to promote 
investment in the field of biotechnology by harmonising patent law, the Directive 
at the same time shows that the EU legislature intended to exclude any 
possibility of patentability where respect for human dignity could thereby be 
affected. On this basis, it gave “wide meaning” to the specific exclusion of 
patentability for “uses of human embryos for industrial or commercial 
purposes”.
97  
Indeed, since exceptions and limitations form an integral part of IP laws, courts 
have to interpret these acts as a whole according to their wording, context, and 
purpose. The Bundesverfassungsgericht recently felt impelled to make the IP 
community take note of this matter of course. As both copyright as well as its 
limitations are underpinned by fundamental rights – namely, the fundamental 
right to property and, for example, the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression - limitations and exceptions must be interpreted neither restrictively 
nor extensively but according to what they are meant to cover under the 
legislative scheme.
98  
                                                 
95 ECJ Joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier League and Others 
and  Karen Murphy [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 163-164; CJEU Case C-145/10  Painer  [2011] 
ECR I-0000, paras 133-134.  
96 CJEU Case C-34/10 Brüstle [2011] ECR I-0000, para 31. 
97 CJEU Case C-34/10 Brüstle [2011] ECR I-0000, paras 32 et seq. 
98 Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 1145/11, 17.11.2011, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2012, 754, 755 with further references. 19 
 
It is true that this framework has to be interpreted in conformity with 
fundamental rights. If the interpretation and application of non-constitutional law 
allow for more than one interpretation, courts must give preference to the one 
that corresponds to the values enshrined in the constitution.
99 Such a reading 
informed by fundamental rights can lead both to giving preference to IP 
protection
100 as well as to favouring communicative freedoms.
101 
However, respect for the legislature requires an interpretation that is “consistent 
with the wording of the statute and preserves the fundamental aim of the 
legislature”.
102 If courts resolve a case by directly balancing conflicting interests 
and fundamental rights, they “encroach upon the relationship between copyright 
and the freedom of the press as already established by the legislature on the 
basis of its discretion”.
103 Deciding IP cases directly on the basis of balancing 
fundamental rights runs afoul of the principle of separation of powers. The 
priority of applying the relevant statutory framework is also reflected in the 
jurisprudence of the CJEU, which requires first and foremost an application of 
                                                 
99 See Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvL 45/56, 23.10.1958, BVerfGE 8, 210, 220-221. 
100  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 1631/08, 30.08.2010, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2011, 288, at para 66 (English version available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20100830_1bvr163108en.html) (the constitutional 
requirement that the proceeds of creative activity should in principle be assigned to the author 
rules out a waiver of any statutory remuneration whatsoever); Bundesgerichtshof Case I ZB 
80/11, 19.04.2011, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2012, 2958 -  Alles kann besser werden 
(copyright has to be enforceable against every infringement on the internet).  
101 Bundesverfassungsgericht Case 1 BvR 825/98, 29.06.2000, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2001, 598 -  Germania III (quotation right); Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 1248/11, 
15.12.2011, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2012, 1205 –  AnyDVD  (reach of injunctions); 
Bundesgerichtshof Case I ZR 117/00, 20.03.2003, IIC 35 (2004), 984 - Gies-Adler (free uses 
and parody); Bundesgerichtshof Case I ZR 159/02, 03.02.2005, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
2005, 2856 - Lila Postkarte (trademark parodies). 
102  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 1631/08, 30.08.2010, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2011, 288, at para 60 (English  version available at 
http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rk20100830_1bvr163108en.html); 
Bundesverfassungsgericht Cases 2 BvR 1041/88, 2 BvR 78/89, 03.06.1992, BVerfGE 86, 288, 
320. Art 20 paras 2 and 3 German Basic Law reads: “(2) All state authority is derived from the 
people. It shall be exercised by the people through elections and other votes and through 
specific legislative, executive and judicial bodies. (3) The legislature shall be bound by the 
constitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice.” (see 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0107). 
103  Bundesverfassungsgericht  Case 1 BvR 1145/11, 17.11.2011, Neue Juristische 
Wochenschrift 2012, 754, 755; Bundesgerichtshof Case I ZR 117/00, 20.03.2003, IIC 35 (2004), 
984 - Gies-Adler (courts have to apply the limitations and exceptions to copyright as codified 
and must not enter into a general balancing exercise); Canadian Supreme Court Entertainment 
Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, 2012 
SCC 34, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231, para 123, (Rothstein J. (dissenting): “While the courts should 
strive to maintain an appropriate balance between these two goals …, inferring limits into the 
communication right in the present case would be beyond the function of the courts”). 20 
 
the acquis and only as a second step, if possible and necessary in the case at 
hand, an interpretation of these statutes in the light of EU fundamental rights.
104  
But what if the applicable IP statute does not allow for a consideration of 
conflicting fundamental freedoms by means of interpretation because it 
specifically rules out certain communicative freedoms? For example, art 6 
Directive 2001/29 on the legal protection of technological protection measures 
does not allow EU Member States to enforce the limitations for the purpose of 
quotations, parody, caricature or pastiche against digital rights management 
systems. The respective list of “first class” copyright limitations and exceptions 
is exhaustive, and moreover, it is not applicable in the digital network 
environment.
105 Thus, the Directive deliberately entitles rightholders to suppress 
even core political speech and artistic behaviour in order to promote pay-per-
use business models on the internet.
106 
But even in such a scenario, courts must not simply switch into the balancing 
mode.
107 Instead of developing an unwritten solution directly on the basis of 
fundamental rights, they have to articulate that the exclusive right as codified 
interferes, as in our example, with the freedom of expression or the freedom of 
the arts. If the court considers this interference to be unjustifiable, it is bound to 
hold that the exclusive IP right in that respect is unconstitutional. The 
consequence would be that the IP right is rendered inapplicable so that the 
freedom of expression automatically prevails. It is then the responsibility and 
competence of the legislature to redefine the content and limits of IP rights in a 
way that duly reflects other fundamental freedoms.
108  
                                                 
104 ECJ Case C-275/06 Promusicae [2008] ECR I-271, para 66; Opinion of Advocate General 
Kokott Case C-275/06  Promusicae  [2008] ECR I-271, para 56 (“The balance between the 
relevant fundamental rights must first  be struck by the Community legislature and, in the 
interpretation of Community law, by the Court.”); see also CJEU Case C-416/10 Jozef Križan 
and others [2013] ECR I-0000, para 115. But see supra notes 16-18. 
105 See art 6 para 4 subpara 4 Directive 2001/29 (supra note 22). 
106  See Alexander Peukert, “Der Schutzbereich des Urheberrechts und das Werk als 
öffentliches Gut. Insbesondere: Die urheberrechtliche Relevanz des privaten Werkgenusses”, 
in: Reto M. Hilty/Alexander Peukert (eds), Interessenausgleich im Urheberrecht, Nomos 2004, 
11-46. 
107 Contra Oberster Gerichtshof Case 4 OB 66/10z, 13.07.2010, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und 
Medienrecht 2011, 275. 
108 See Alexander Peukert, supra note 78, at 265 et seq. See further Canadian Supreme Court 
Entertainment Software Association v. Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of 
Canada, 2012 SCC 34, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 231 para 125 (Rothstein J, dissenting: “providing 
exceptions to the right to communicate by telecommunication is properly left to Parliament. 
History has shown that Parliament will indeed legislate when it considers copyright protection to 
be improperly balanced”). 21 
 
III. Conclusion: Positivism and the Democratic Legitimacy of IP Law 
 
Until now, courts in Europe and elsewhere tried to avoid such a finding by either 
interpreting limitations broadly or by subjecting the IP right to a general 
balancing test. These escape attempts are not surprising. First, courts find 
themselves in a paradoxical situation: By exhibiting judicial self-restraint and 
foregoing the option to repair a broken legislative scheme, they have to be even 
more assertive and tell the legislature that it acted unconstitutionally. Second, 
property rights are a core element of a liberal rule of law. They are meant to 
establish autonomy in the economic sphere. It is not easy to accept that these 
legal tools can have the contrary effect, namely to unconstitutionally limit 
personal freedoms. However, the massive expansion of IP rights under the 
banner of a self-referential “property logic” has increased the risk of such 
conflicts.
109  
The methodological and doctrinal solution outlined in this article is not a matter 
of positivist formalism. Instead, it ensures, in several respects, the legitimacy of 
the IP system as a whole. For an IP system is legitimate only if it is grounded on 
democratic decision making, if its boundaries are regulated in a foreseeable 
manner and if it is responsive to new technological and social circumstances. 
All these conditions can only be fulfilled by continuous legislative 
adjustments - if necessary, upon an exceptional wake-up call by the judiciary. 
                                                 
109 For a liberal critique of a “property logic” see Alexander Peukert, supra note 29, at 896 et 
seq. 